Disaster Med Public Health Prep by Schnall, Amy et al.
Characterization of Carbon Monoxide Exposure During 
Hurricane Sandy and Subsequent Nor’easter
Ms. Amy Schnall, MPH, Dr. Royal Law, PhD, Dr. Amy Heinzerling, MD, Dr. Kanta Sircar, 
MPH, PhD, PMP, Mr. Scott Damon, CPH, Dr. Fuyuen Yip, PhD, Dr. Josh Schier, MD, Dr. 
Tesfaye Bayleyegn, MD, and Dr. Amy Wolkin, DrPH
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Atlanta, 
Georgia (Ms Schnall, Dr Law, Dr Sircar, Mr Damon, Dr Yip, Dr Schier, Dr Bayleyegn, Dr Wolkin), 
and University of California San Francisco, Department of Internal Medicine, San Francisco, 
California (Dr Heinzerling)
Abstract
Objective—Carbon monoxide (CO) is an odorless, colorless gas produced by fossil fuel 
combustion. On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy moved ashore near Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
causing widespread morbidity and mortality, $30 to $50 billion in economic damage, and 8.5 
million households to be without power. The combination of power outages and unusually low 
temperatures led people to use alternate power sources, placing many at risk for CO exposure.
Methods—We examined Hurricane Sandy–related CO exposures from multiple perspectives to 
help identify risk factors and develop strategies to prevent future exposures. This report combined 
data from 3 separate sources (health departments, poison centers via the National Poison Data 
System, and state and local public information officers).
Results—Results indicated that the number of CO exposures in the wake of Hurricane Sandy 
was significantly greater than in previous years. The persons affected were mostly females and 
those in younger age categories and, despite messaging, most CO exposures occurred from 
improper generator use.
Conclusions—Our findings emphasize the continued importance of CO-related communication 
and ongoing surveillance of CO exposures to support public health response and prevention during 
and after disasters. Additionally, regional poison centers can be a critical resource for potential on-
site management, public health promotion, and disaster-related CO exposure surveillance.
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Carbon monoxide (CO) is an odorless, colorless gas, often produced by fossil fuel 
combustion. CO exposure can lead to severe illness and death. When power outages occur 
during disasters such as hurricanes or winter storms, elevated levels of CO can build up in 
enclosed structures (eg, the home or garage) through the use of alternative sources of fuel for 
electricity generation, heating, cooling, or cooking.1–3 The health effects of CO exposure 
can range from mild symptoms, such as headache, nausea, and dizziness, to more severe 
outcomes, including loss of consciousness, long-term neurologic damage, cardiac 
arrhythmias, respiratory failure, and death. CO exposure is preventable, but when it does 
occur, it can be treated effectively when identified in a timely manner.4,5
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy, the largest Atlantic hurricane on record, moved 
ashore near Atlantic City, New Jersey, as a post-tropical cyclone with hurricane-force winds. 
Sandy killed at least 131 people in 8 states and caused an estimated $30 to $50 billion in 
damage.6,7 There were over 8.5 million power outages across 21 states, with some areas 
remaining without power for more than 2 weeks. The combination of widespread power 
outages and low temperatures caused by the ensuing nor’easter led people to use alternate 
power sources, which placed many persons at risk for CO exposure. Despite extensive public 
health messaging about the hazards of CO exposure, a report published by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) during the incident identified 263 Hurricane Sandy–
related CO exposures in the 8 days after the hurricane made landfall.8
We examined Hurricane Sandy–related CO exposures from multiple sources to identify risk 
factors for CO exposure during Sandy and to develop strategies to prevent exposures during 
future disasters.
METHODS
This report combined data from 3 separate sources (health departments, poison centers, and 
public information officers at health departments, regional health commissions, and tribal 
organizations) to develop an overview of disaster-related CO exposure during Hurricane 
Sandy.
Syndromic Surveillance
We asked health departments for New York City and 9 states (Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) 
affected by Hurricane Sandy for CO exposures captured by syndromic surveillance. Health 
departments in New Jersey, Virginia, New York, and New York City provided data from 
their syndromic surveillance systems for October 28 through November 11, 2012, and where 
available, for the same period in 2010 and 2011. Syndromic surveillance cases were iden-
tified by emergency department or hospital chief complaints, depending on availability. Case 
definitions varied somewhat by state, and typically included chief complaints with terms 
such as “carbon monoxide,” “CO exposure,” or “poisoning.” The type of data provided also 
varied by state. Some states provided additional information such as whether CO levels were 
measured in the residence by a first responder. Others only provided summary counts and 
demographics (ie, age and sex) for the period of interest. We could not exclude intentional or 
fire-related exposures because most cases did not have this level of detail; however, if the 
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case mentioned “suicide” or “fire,” the case was excluded by the state health department. 
Also, most states did not differentiate exposures as directly related or unrelated to Hurricane 
Sandy.
Poison Center Data
The National Poison Data System (NPDS) collects information from calls made to each of 
the 55 regional poison centers in the United States. Since 2001, the CDC has collaborated 
with the American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) to use the NPDS for 
surveillance of chemical exposures and poisonings. The CDC also uses the NPDS for post-
disaster surveillance. During Hurricane Sandy, poison center staff members used a unique 
code to identify storm-related calls, which enabled the CDC and the AAPCC to track storm-
related calls using the NPDS in near real-time during the response. We collected NPDS data 
from the 5 states with the most reported CO calls: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, and West Virginia. We retrospectively queried NPDS data for calls from 
persons reporting an exposure to CO among the 7 poison centers in the 5 selected states for a 
1-month period beginning on October 28, 2012 (1 day prior to the storm), and ending 
November 28, 2012. Only CO calls related to human exposures with documented health 
effects were included. Calls from people only requesting information on CO were excluded. 
CO exposures related to intentional injury (eg, suicide, abuse) were also excluded. We 
collected information on demographics, adverse health effects, exposure type, location of 
treatment and disposition, therapies recommended, illness severity, and route and source of 
exposure. Illness severity is categorized in NPDS as follows:
• Minor: exhibited some symptoms as a result of the exposure, but the symptoms 
were minimally bothersome.
• Moderate: exhibited symptoms as a result of the exposure that were more 
pronounced, more prolonged, or more of a systemic nature than minor 
symptoms.
• Major: exhibited symptoms as a result of the exposure that were life-threatening 
or resulted in significant residual disability or disfigurement.
• Death: died as a result of the exposure or as a direct complication of the 
exposure.
For each reported exposure, poison centers often include additional information in an open-
text notes field that is not uploaded to NPDS. The 7 poison centers provided CDC with the 
open-text notes for the identified CO exposures that had documented adverse health effects. 
These de-identified notes were reviewed by 2 independent reviewers to extract additional 
data on source of exposure, presence or absence of CO detectors, and other contributing 
factors (eg, serum carboxyhemoglobin levels). A third epidemiologist reviewed and 
reconciled any discrepancies. Data were analyzed by use of Epi Info 7 (Center for 
Surveillance, Epidemiology & Laboratory Services, Division of Health Informatics & 
Surveillance, Atlanta, GA; https://www.cdc.gov/epiinfo/index.html).
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Communications Survey
The National Public Health Information Coalition (NPHIC) sent a written survey about CO 
prevention messaging to 38 public information officers affected by Hurricane Sandy. These 
included state health departments, regional health commissions, and tribal organizations. 
The survey asked questions regarding types of media used for CO prevention messaging (eg, 
social media, print media, television), timing of the messaging with respect to storm, type of 
information included, translation of messaging into languages other than English, and source 
of the messaging content. For the questions on the type of information included in the 
messaging, we focused on proper placement of generator, use of a CO alarm with battery 
backup, and use of improper heating sources indoors. Information questions on the source of 
messaging content asked whether the material was designed in-house or by another agency 
such as CDC, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or poison centers. 
NPHIC also asked public information officers whether they thought their CO messaging was 
effective, what the challenges were to the CO message distribution, and for any other 
pertinent information to improve storm-related CO messaging. Descriptive statistics, 
including frequencies and percentages, were used to describe the results from the 
communication survey. We used MS Excel (Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA) to analyze the 
data. Qualitative data were analyzed by using a thematic approach to identify challenges to 
and opportunities for communicating CO safety messages.
RESULTS
Syndromic Surveillance
A total of 566 reported CO exposures were identified by syndromic surveillance for October 
28 through November 15, 2012, from the New York State Department of Health (NYDOH; 
n = 241), New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH; n = 
88), New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH; n = 218), and Virginia Department of 
Health (VDH; n =9) (Table 1). Among the identified patients, 341 were female (60%) and 
the majority were under 45; 202 (36%) were younger than 18 years, 201 (36%) were aged 
18–44 years. We compared syndromic surveillance data for the same period in 2010 and 
2011 from the NYDOH and NYC DOHMH, which reported 331 CO exposures from 
October 28 to November 15, 2012. For the same 15-day period, there was an increase of 
299% in exposures reported compared to 2011 (n = 83) and a 513% increase in reported 
exposures compared to 2010 (n =54). Demographics were similar in all 3 years.
Poison Center Data
Between October 28, 2012, and November 28, 2012, a total of 535 calls to poison centers 
were identified by using the Hurricane Sandy unique code. The majority of calls identified 
with the unique code were from New Jersey (n =350), followed by Connecticut (n = 63) and 
Pennsylvania (n =58). New York City identified an additional 99 calls without the use of the 
Hurricane Sandy unique code (Table 2). Of those calls, a total of 289 (46%) met our 
selection criteria. Among those calls, 168 (58%) were from females, and 217 (75%) were 
made from residences (Table 3). The most common health effects reported were headache 
(175 [61%]), nausea (94 [33%]), and dizziness (84 [29%]). A smaller proportion of patients 
also reported more severe symptoms. Those included vomiting (56 [19%]) and syncope or 
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loss of consciousness (39 [13%]). Among the 289 patients, 176 (61%) were treated in 
emergency departments, 53 (18%) required admission to hospitals, and 32 (11%) did not 
require or receive treatment at a health care facility. For 36 (12%) patients, hyperbaric 
oxygen was administered. Among the 288 clinical outcomes classified in NPDS by trained 
specialists in poison information, 164 (57%) were minor, 95 (33%) were moderate, and 25 
(9%) were major. Four deaths (1%) were documented.
Data on exposure source were available for 213 (74%) of the 289 calls (Table 4). Generators 
were the most common source of exposure (75 [35%]), followed by heaters (55 [26%]) and 
charcoal or gas grills (49 [23%]). Of the 75 calls with generator-related exposures, 34 (45%) 
reported that the generator was improperly placed indoors (16 in a garage, 10 in a basement, 
and 8 in another indoor location). Of the 28 (37%) calls where generator placement was 
outdoors, 15 were improperly placed within 20 feet (6.1 m) of the residence and 12 did not 
specify distance. Only 1 generator was reported to be placed at the recommended distance of 
at least 20 feet.9
Communications Survey
Twelve (32%) of the public information officers (8 state health departments, 3 local health 
departments, and 1 tribal association) responded to the survey about CO-related 
communications during Hurricane Sandy. Among the 12 officers, 11 used social media to 
distribute messages, 9 used press releases, and 8 used news media and print media (Table 5). 
Half of the officers distributed most of their messaging only after the hurricane. Only one 
officer reported distributing most of the CO messaging before the storm. Four reported equal 
distribution before and after Hurricane Sandy made landfall.
Messages from 11 of the officers focused on proper generator placement; 10 warned about 
improper heating, such as using grills indoors; and 8 advised using battery-operated CO 
alarms. Eight of the officers reported using materials from other agencies, such as CDC, 
poison centers, FEMA, their state health department, and, where available, material designed 
by their organization. Three of the officers reported using only their materials. Overall, 10 
(83%) of the public information officers thought their CO-related messaging during 
Hurricane Sandy was effective. Seven of the officers distributed messaging in other 
languages, along with English. All of those, 7 distributed materials in Spanish. Three also 
provided material in Chinese, 2 in Vietnamese, 2 in French, and 2 in Russian. One 
organization also reported translating material into Haitian Creole, Italian, Polish, and 
Portuguese.
Several themes were identified in the qualitative survey comments. Among the 12 officers 
who responded, half identified power outages after the storm as a challenge to effective 
delivery of CO-related messaging. Most identified the news media as helpful in distributing 
messaging, although one organization felt that the news media were unwilling to pick up 
CO-related messages until reported exposures started to occur. Eleven officers identified 
social media as an important messaging tool and would like more examples of social media 
messaging from federal and state authorities. Seven of the respondents used information 
designed by the federal government and 9 also used information designed by their own 
organization.
Schnall et al. Page 5
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
DISCUSSION
Disaster-related CO exposure remains a significant public health concern following storms 
and other disasters. The widespread power outages from Hurricane Sandy and low 
temperatures were associated with a surge in CO exposures reported through syndromic 
surveillance and the poison centers in the affected region. The number of CO exposures in 
the wake of Sandy was significantly greater than exposures in previous years. Consistent 
with previous reports, persons affected by storm-related CO exposure mostly included 
females and those in younger age categories.3,4
Despite targeted messaging by state and local health departments, most CO exposures 
occurred from improper generator use. The data suggest the importance of providing CO 
prevention messaging, especially in the days leading up to the disaster, because power 
outages can interfere with the ability to provide any messaging during and after the storm. 
However, even with power outages, the poison centers in the region remained in service for 
calls throughout the disaster and potentially could be used to disseminate information for 
callers concerned with CO exposure.
Although syndromic surveillance and poison center data lack laboratory confirmation, the 
ability to use these systems during a disaster to track CO exposures can lead to quicker 
public health action during a response. Timely information is essential to a successful 
response, and these data sources can provide information quickly to decision-makers. 
Additionally, the details in poison center case notes can provide exposure scenario 
information that might be difficult to obtain through other means. The exposure information 
can be used to tailor public health messaging.
Limitations
The findings in this report are subject to several limitations, some of which may have led to 
an underestimation of Hurricane Sandy–related CO exposures. Syndromic surveillance data 
were only available for a small subset of states and did not provide a complete picture of the 
affected region. Because of the nonspecific nature of CO exposure symptoms, patients could 
be misdiagnosed or could go unrecognized by the syndromic surveillance system. NPDS 
relies on data voluntarily reported to poison centers by health care providers and the public; 
therefore, we likely did not capture all exposures. In addition, those with minor symptoms 
may not seek medical treatment or advice and therefore we are more likely to capture more 
severe exposures. Data surrounding the circumstance of CO exposure, such as the source of 
exposure and presence of a CO detector, were not reported for all calls. It is important that 
poison centers ask for these scenario-specific details related to the ongoing disaster, 
provided that it does not detract from the primary functions of remote triage and clinical 
consultation. These details can aid in identifying risk factors or exposures and allow for 
timely and targeted interventions. Another limitation was the low response rate to the 
communication survey, although we did receive responses from the states most impacted by 
the storm. Finally, because all data were de-identified to protect private health information, 
we were unable to compare the different datasets for overlapping cases, and therefore looked 
at our data sources separately.
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CONCLUSION
This report characterizes suspected CO exposures during Hurricane Sandy identified through 
multiple data sources. These data identified common risk factors for disaster-related CO 
exposure (eg, improper heating source and generator placement), which can be used to 
inform prevention strategies and target public health interventions to help decrease the 
likelihood of CO exposure associated with future disasters. Our findings on risk factors are 
consistent with previous published reports, which suggest that the data sources used in our 
analysis are useful in providing information to help target persons most at risk. Despite 
limitations within each source of data, the sources provided distinct, useful, and 
complementary information that gave a more complete picture of reported CO exposures. 
Given the different approaches to data collection, the combined use of syndromic 
surveillance and poison center data for CO surveillance may allow public health to more 
broadly capture the affected populations during future events. Disaster plans should 
incorporate public health messaging about CO exposure risks, especially before a storm, so 
that people planning to remain in the area can better prepare. Because of power outages, 
messages solely distributed after the storm may reach fewer people who need the 
information. In addition to messaging, other prevention strategies can be considered. For 
example, health departments could collaborate with stores to provide point-of-sale 
information on safe generator use (eg, pamphlets on the shelf next to the generators), as well 
as a checklist of safety supplies, such as a battery-operated CO detector. Door-to-door 
outreach after a disaster, such as placing door hangers with generator safety messages at 
homes in the affected area,10 is another approach; however, the success of these approaches 
has not been evaluated.
Our findings emphasize the continued importance of CO-related communication and 
ongoing surveillance of CO exposures to support public health response and prevention 
during and after natural disasters. During a disaster, regional poison centers can be a critical 
resource for potential on-site management, public health promotion, and disaster-related CO 
exposure surveillance. Reported CO exposure surveillance can provide vital information to 
disaster planners and health department epidemiologists.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge the following partners and agencies who helped support this project. Our state partners who 
collaborated and shared their data: Kathryn Lane, Kathy Decker, Rebecca Leprell, Loretta Haddy, Patricia 
Przysiecki, Jerald Fagliano, Stella Tsai, Emily Knearl, Marjorie Shannon, Linda Popels. Our poison center partners 
from Connecticut Poison Control Center, New Jersey Poison Information and Education System, New York City 
Poison Control Center, Pittsburgh Poison Center, Poison Control Center at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 
Upstate New York Poison Center, and West Virginia Poison Center who compiled and de-identified the poison 
center case information. The following Centers for Disease Control and Prevention staff who provided support: 
Jacqueline Clower and Kristen Jarmen. Data collection on communication activities was not sponsored by CDC and 
was determined by CDC as non-research.
References
1. Hampson NB, Stock AL. Storm-related carbon monoxide poisoning: lessons learned from recent 
epidemics. Undersea Hyperb Med. 2006; 33(4):257–263. [PubMed: 17004412] 
Schnall et al. Page 7
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Carbon monoxide poisoning after Hurricane Katrina—
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, August-September 2005. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2005; 54(39):996–998. [PubMed: 16208314] 
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Carbon monoxide exposures after Hurricane Ike—
Texas, September 2008. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2009; 58(31):845–849. [PubMed: 
19680219] 
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Nonfatal, unintentional, non-fire-related carbon 
monoxide exposures—United States, 2004–2006. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2008; 57(33):
896–899. [PubMed: 18716581] 
5. Raub JA, Mathieu-Nolf M, Hampson NB, Thom SR. Carbon monoxide poisoning—a public health 
perspective. Toxicology. 2000; 145(1):1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0300-483X(99)00217-6. 
[PubMed: 10771127] 
6. Weather.com. [Accessed February 10, 2016] Sandy: five latest developments. http://
www.weather.com/news/news/sandy-top-five-20121028. Published October 31, 2012
7. Painter, WL., Brown, JT. Congressional Research Service. [Accessed February 10, 2016] FY2013 
Supplemental funding for disaster relief. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42869.pdf. Published February 
19, 2013
8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Carbon monoxide exposures reported to poison centers 
and related to Hurricane Sandy—northeastern United States, 2012. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly 
Rep. 2012; 61(44):905. [PubMed: 23134974] 
9. Wang, L., Emmerich, SJ. NIST Technical Note 1637. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, US Department of Commerce; Modeling the effects of outdoor gasoline 
powered generator use on indoor carbon monoxide exposures. http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/
build09/PDF/b09009.pdf. Published August 2009 [Accessed February 16, 2016]
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [Accessed October 29, 2016] Carbon Monoxide 
Poisoning: Flyers and Other Educational Materials. CDC website. https://www.cdc.gov/
disasters/co-materials.html. Published August 28, 2008
Schnall et al. Page 8
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Schnall et al. Page 9
TABLE 1
Carbon Monoxide Exposures Identified by Syndromic Surveillance Systems Among 4 Health Departments in 
3 States, Hurricane Sandy, October 28–November 15, 2012a
Characteristic No. %
Age (years)
 0–17 202 36
 18–44 201 36
 45–64 99 17
 ≥65 64 11
Sex
 Male 225 40
 Female 341 60
a
n =566. The majority of calls identified with the unique code were from New Jersey (n =350), followed by Connecticut (n = 63) and Pennsylvania 
(n=58), West Virginia (n =29), Virginia (n = 13), and New York (n = 11).
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Schnall et al. Page 10
TABLE 2
Total Number of Carbon Monoxide Exposure Calls to Poison Centers, Hurricane Sandy, October 28–
November 28, 2012a
State No. %
New Jersey 350 55
New York City 99 16
Connecticut 63 10
Pennsylvania 58 9
West Virginia 29 5
Virginia 13 2
New York 11 2
Other 11 2
a
n =634.
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TABLE 3
Unintentional Carbon Monoxide Exposures With Reported Health Effects Identified by 5 States, Hurricane 
Sandy, October 28–November 28, 2012a
Characteristic No. %
Sex (n = 283)
 Male 115 40
 Female 168 57
Location of exposure
 Residence 217 75
 Commercial location 14 5
 Other 16 6
 Not disclosed 42 14
Exposure route
 Inhalation/nasal 273 95
 Ingestion 9 3
 Both 7 2
Health effect
 Headache 175 61
 Nausea 94 33
 Dizziness 84 29
 Vomiting 56 19
 Syncope or loss of consciousness 39 13
 Lethargy or drowsiness 34 12
 Tachycardia 17 6
 Dyspnea 11 4
 Confusion 9 3
 Muscle weakness 9 3
 Chest pain 8 3
 Respiratory arrest 8 3
 Other 134 46
Treatment location
 Emergency department 176 61
 Admitted to hospital 53 18
 No healthcare treatment 32 11
 Unknown 28 10
Therapy performed
 Oxygen 204 71
 Fresh air 99 34
 Hyperbaric oxygen 36 12
 Antiemetics 9 3
 Fluids 8 3
 IV 4 1
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Characteristic No. %
 Other 27 9
Clinical outcome
 Minor 164 57
 Moderate 95 33
 Major 25 9
 Death 4 1
a
n =289. The 5 states were New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and West Virginia.
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TABLE 4
Exposure Source of Unintentional Carbon Monoxide Exposures With Documented Health Effects Identified 
by 5 States, Hurricane Sandy and Nor’easter, October 28–November 28, 2012a
Characteristics No. %
Generator 75 35
 Placed indoors 34 45
  In garage 16 21
  In basement 10 13
  Another indoor location 8 11
 Placed outdoors 28 37
  Within 20 feet of residence 15 20
  At least 20 feet from residence 1 1
  Unknown/not specified 12 16
 Unknown placement 13 6
Heater 55 26
Charcoal or gas grill 49 23
Other (eg, gas stove or oven, vehicle) 34 16
a
n = 213. The 5 states were New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and West Virginia.
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TABLE 5
Carbon Monoxide-Related Messaging and Communications From 12 Public Information Officers During 
Hurricane Sandya
Characteristic No. %
Message distribution method
 Social media 11 92
 Press release 9 75
 News media 8 67
 Print materials 8 67
 Agency website 7 58
Timing of message
 Before the storm 1 8
 After the storm 6 50
 Equally before and after the storm 4 33
 No response 1 8
Message content
 Proper generator placement 11 92
 Improper heating 10 83
 Need for battery-operated CO alarms 8 67
 Symptoms of CO exposure 4 33
Message source
 Organization created 3 25
 Combined sources 8 67
  CDC 7 58
  Poison centers 3 25
  FEMA 2 17
  State health department 2 17
Language of message
 English only 3 25
 Spanish 7 58
 Chinese 3 25
 Vietnamese 2 17
 French 2 17
 Russian 2 17
 Other 1 8
aAbbreviations: CO, carbon monoxide; FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Source: National Public Health Information Coalition.
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